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Constitutional Fact Review: An Essential Exception
to Anderson v. Bessemer
INTRODUCTION
In a fiercely contested bench trial, the federal judge rules the defendant
did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff appeals, insisting
that the trial judge erred in its findings of fact, and that this error resulted
in an unjust denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights. The appellate court
then faces a dilemma: under what standard of review 9hould it examine the
trial court fact findings?
This Note explores appellate review of bench trial fact findings for con-
stitutional cases. The Note begins by discussing the most obvious standard
of review. This standard is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which
mandates, "[flindings of fact .. . shall not be set aside unless clearly er-
roneous." ' The Note traces the history of this rule through Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City,2 the Supreme Court's most recent statement about
Rule 52(a). In Anderson, the Court explained that an appellate court must
uphold the trial court fact findings unless these findings appear implausible
in light of the evidence. Even if the appellate court prefers another inter-
pretation of the facts, it must uphold any trial court fact finding which is
not clear error.
The Note contends that Rule 52(a) review, as defined in Anderson, proves
beneficial for most cases, but is inadequate for fact review in constitutional
cases. Constitutional rights frequently hinge on fact findings in these cases.
Thus, the trial court might make a factual error which would cause an
improper denial of a constitutional rights claim. Anderson, for two reasons,
does not adequately guard against such an error. First, under the narrow
Anderson review, an appellate court could uphold any "plausible" fact
finding, even if this finding failed to protect constitutional rights to the
greatest extent possible. Second, several ambiguities exist within Anderson.
The exact scope of appellate review under Anderson remains uncertain, and
so does the distinction between a "finding of fact" subject to Anderson
review and a "finding of law." The importance of fact findings in consti-
tutional cases for the protection of constitutional rights demands an especially
consistent, independent review of the facts.
This Note then examines a line of Supreme Court cases which suggest
that appellate courts can independently review constitutional facts. The Note
1. FED. R. Cirv. P. 52(a).
2. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
asserts, however, that these cases do not provide sufficiently clear and decisive
guidelines for this independent review. For example, the Court has not
clarified whether this independent review applies to all facts in all consti-
tutional cases, or to a more limited range of facts or cases. The Court has
also failed to define the scope of appellate review for these constitutional
facts, as well as the circumstances in which this independent review is added
to Rule 52(a). The appellate cases reviewing constitutional facts reflect these
uncertainties; they fluctuate between review under the Anderson-Rule 52(a)
standard, independent review, or various combinations of these standards.
This Note proposes a solution to the dilemma of constitutional fact review;
the Supreme Court should, in a new case, formulate a definite standard of
constitutional fact review. Under this standard appellate courts would in-
dependently examine the findings of fact in constitutional fact cases to insure
that these findings do not result in an unjust denial of a party's constitutional
rights. The appellate courts would, of course, continue to use the Anderson
review for most cases. The independent review of constitutional facts, how-
ever, would provide an added check against improper denial of constitutional
rights.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BEFORE LAW AND EQUITY MERGED
A. Appellate Review in the Colonies
Throughout American history, controversy and confusion have sur-
rounded appellate review of trial judges' fact findings.' The structure of
courts in colonial America invited this difficulty. As a general rule, the
American colonies copied the English two-prong court structure with courts
of law and courts of equity.4 A trial jury heard most cases in the courts
3. The Constitution and subsequent cases firmly establish the standard of appellate fact
review for jury decisions:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In cases like Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891), the Court has consistently
affirmed that an appellate court cannot overturn facts found by a jury unless no substantial
evidence supports the findings. Appellate review of trial judges' fact findings in bench trials,
however, not guarded by such a provision, continually floundered between competing standards.
See infra notes 4-34 and accompanying text.
4. The colonies copied this dual court system from the division between Courts of King's
Bench and Courts of Chancery in England. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
107-08 (1941). In the early American colonies, the two systems of review, the law writ of error
and the equity appeal, had vied for power, but by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
[Vol. 62:12091210
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
of law, 5 and the appellate court could review the evidence by "writ of
error" only to judge the jury's legal conclusions, not the findings of fact. 6
A trial judge heard equity cases, but in equity the appellate court could
review the evidence by "appeal" and freely judge and alter the trial court's
findings of law and findings of fact.7 In actuality, however, striking
inconsistencies appeared between the colonies' court systems. Some col-
onies used only law courts, others held both law and equity courts, and
within each type of court the procedure for appellate review varied between
the colonies."
B. Judiciary Act of 1789: Uniform Appellate Review
Due to the uncertain nature of fact review, conflict erupted in the United
States legislature when Congress convened in 1789 to enact a statute estab-
lishing federal courts and their review procedure. 9 Federalists, attempting to
place power in the central government, advocated the broad fact review
associated with equity, which would increase the scope of appellate and
Supreme Court review and place added power and discretion in the central
courts.10 Anti-Federalists, who preferred government power to be dispersed
among the states, supported narrow fact review, leaving discretion over fact
finding in the trial courts.1" The Judiciary Act of 178912 represented a com-
writ of error had started to gain prominence. Id. at 88. By the time of the American Revolution,
writ of error became the normal type of review in the colonies. Id. For a description of the
development of the writ in various colonies, see id. at 86-94.
5. In a few kinds of cases at law, no right to a jury trial existed. Here, the trial judge's
findings of fact would have the same finality as would a jury's findings. 3 J. MOORE & J.
FRIEDMAN, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE: A TREATiSE ON THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIvnL PRO-
CEDURE § 52.01 (1st ed. 1938).
6. See R. POUND, supra note 4, at 109-10. See generally Clark & Stone, Review of Findings
of Fact, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 190 (1937).
7. See 3 J. MooRE & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at § 52.01; see also Clark & Stone,
supra note 6, at 190.
8. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAgv. L.
REv. 49 (1923), provides examples of these different court systems:
There were Courts of Chancery [equity], in 1787, in New York, South Carolina,
Maryland, Virginia, and to some extent in New Jersey; in Pennsylvania, Delaware
and North Carolina, there were no such courts, though the common law courts
had certain equity powers; in Connecticut and Rhode Island, the Legislature
exercised some powers of a Court of Chancery; in Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, there were common law courts only, having a few very limited equity
powers. Georgia had only common law courts.
Id. at 96. See also R. POUND, supra note 4, at 80-94.
9. For a detailed and lively description of the progression of the Judiciary Act through
Congress, see generally Warren, supra note 8.
10. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 192-93; Warren, supra note 8, at 131.
11. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 192-93; Warren, supra note 8, at 131.
12. First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The Act created the Federal Courts,
including thirteen districts with a district court in each, and three circuits with a circuit court
in each. The Act also established procedures for these courts.
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promise between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions,13 but in signif-
icant ways the Act favored the Anti-Federalist position of narrow fact
review.' 4 For example, the Act provided the limited writ of error appeal for
both law and equity cases,' 5 and prohibited equity cases except when no
adequate remedy at law existed. 6 The Act also abolished proof by deposition
and substituted proof by oral argument which made effective appellate review
more difficult. 7
C. Acts of 1800: Divided Appellate Review
In the years following the Judiciary Act, the Federalists and Anti-Fed-
eralists eagerly attempted to amend 8 and to interpret the Act to conform
to their beliefs.' 9 The Anti-Federalists gained power in 1800 and immediately
passed new Acts to alter appellate review by making it broader. 20 As a result
of these Acts, Congress established two standards of review for trial court
fact findings: de novo review for equity actions, and a more restricted review
for law actions.2'
13. Warren, supra note 8, at 131, describes the tremendous division between the Federalist
and Anti-Federalist positions, and shows the delicate balance the Act struck in attempting to
please both sides:
As has been stated, the Judiciary Act was a measure in the nature of a compromise
between the extreme federalist view that the full extent of judicial power granted
by the Constitution should be vested by Congress in the Federal Courts, and the
view of those who feared the new Government as a destroyer of the rights of the
States, who wished all suits to be decided first in the State Courts, and only on
appeal by the Federal Supreme Court.
Id.
14. Id. at 53.
15. "[Flinal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court... may be reexamined,
and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court ... upon writ of error .... Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
16. The Act permitted equity jurisdiction where there was no "plain, adequate and complete
remedy" at law. First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
17. "[Ihe mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court
shall be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial of causes in equity
and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as of actions at common law." First Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88-90. At common law, attorneys examined witnesses by oral
testimony rather than by depositions as used in equity. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 194.
See also Warren, supra note 8, at 100.
18. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 194; Warren, supra note 8, at 54. These attempts to
amend the Act proved that the Act did not truly resolve the earlier conflict. Blume, Review
of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. Am. JuDiCATuRE Soc'Y 68, 68 (1936).
19. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 328-29 (1796).
20. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 196. The Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat.
156, 166, states that either party can request witness testimony to be taken by deposition. This
would make appellate fact review easier. The ensuing Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2
Stat. 244, took the major step of allowing review by appeal in equity and providing that a
transcript of the record and the evidence should be sent to the Supreme Court for its review.
The Court in In re The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 132, 137-42 (1817), stated that these
acts abolished the writ of error in equity cases. Thus, broader review was reinstated.
21. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 196.
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These two standards remained constant throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, but subtle yet substantial changes in law and equity
foretold a merger of these procedures of appellate fact review.Y By the
1930's, the gap between law and equity and the type of review accompanying
each procedure diminished. 23 Nevertheless, some distinction in appellate re-
view for law and equity remained. For example, an Act 24 intending to abolish
writ of error and to establish appeal review for law cases evoked the anger
of lawyers and judges.25 Congress quickly amended the Act so that review
22. The Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 773 (1928)), took the first major step toward this result by allowing parties to waive
a jury trial for actions at law, so that both law and equity cases could now be tried before a
judge. Note, Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is the Proposed
Amendment to Rule 52(a) the Correct Solution? 30 ViiL. L. REv. 227, 231 (1985). In a law
action before a judge, however, the appellate court would examine the fact findings with the
deference it formerly gave jury fact findings. Id. at 232.
Legislation in the states also contributed to the growing similarity between law and equity.
In the nineteenth century, states adopted field codes which combined law and equity actions.
Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 200-01. In 1872, Congress passed the Conformity Act, ch.
255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1928)), which
mandated that federal law procedure conform as much as possible to state law procedure in
the state in which the federal court was located. Therefore, some of the federal courts began
to combine law and equity actions. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533 (1936). In addition, the scope of federal appellate review became
more important with the creation of the circuit courts of appeals in the Evarts Act of 1891.
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826. See Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the
Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. Rav. 787, 788-90
(1983).
The twentieth century showed a continuation of this movement toward merging law and
equity. In the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, the jurisdiction for federal review
expanded, making the review more significant. The Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat.
936, attempted to combat a new Supreme Court overload by rendering its jurisdiction primarily
discretionary, and giving much of its former appellate jurisdiction to the federal appellate
courts. R. FORRESt, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 832
(Dobie & Ladd, 2d ed. 1950).
23. Appellate courts at this time varied on how much deference they gave to the trial court
fact findings in equity cases as they reviewed these findings. R. PouND, supra note 4, at 301;
Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 208-09. As Clark and Stone explained, the type of evidence
used at trial often influenced the scope of equitable appellate review. For instance, the appellate
courts tended to hold fact findings based on oral witness testimony presumptively correct, since
the trial court had a superior opportunity to observe the evidence. The appellate courts more
freely reviewed fact findings based on documentary evidence, since they could observe the
evidence as well as the trial court. If documents conflicted with each other, the appellate court
viewed the trial court fact findings as presumptively correct, but the presumption was rebuttable.
Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 207-08.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 861(a) (1936) (obsolete).
25. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 204-05:
But so great was the outcry from bench and bar alike, which interpreted the
reform to be a substitution of the equity review for that at law, that the further
Act of April 26, 1928, was immediately passed, which emasculated the proposed
reform into a mere change of words by providing that the statutes regulating the
right to a writ of error, defining the relief which may be had thereon, and
prescribing the mode of exercising that right and of invoking that relief, should
121319871
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at law, while now labelled an "appeal," retained its traditional character-
istics.26
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): Uniform
Appellate Review Reinstated
Congress, responding to the confusion surrounding the law and equity
distinction, authorized the Supreme Court, in 1934, to formulate procedural
rules for the merger of law and equity. 27 The new procedural rules needed
a provision for uniform appellate review of trial court fact findings, a major
change from the former system. 28 A proposed Rule 68 presented the first
solution: "The findings of court in such cases shall have the same effect as
that heretofore given to findings in suits of equity." ' 29 The Advisory Com-
mittee seemed to view this as a type of de novo review, which would permit
an appellate court to examine and judge the evidence freely, possibly arriving
at new fact conclusions and disregarding those of the trial court, 30 although
at the time, equity review actually encompassed a variety of standards the
courts had developed. 31 Some Committee members and commentators sup-
ported this Rule32 and others opposed it.33 A heated conflict developed.
be applicable to the appeal substituted for the old writ of error. Thus the old
writ of error now became known as an appeal, but its characteristics remained
unchanged otherwise.
(footnotes omitted).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 861(b) (1936) (obsolete).
27. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064.
28. The Advisory Committee for the Rules had a choice between three standards of review.
The Committee rejected one option, retaining the law and equity dual standards, because it
would frustrate the goal of the rules to abolish the law and equity distinction. The Committee,
without an explanation, rejected the second option, retaining the "writ of error" review for
all cases. The Committee accepted as a starting point the broader review formerly applied in
equity, and began attempting to formulate a new standard from this one. ADVIsoRY CoMUTrEE
ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF TnE UNITED STATES AND THE
SuPRmp COURT OF COLU MIA 120-21 (1936).
29. Id. at 118.
30. This is apparent by the fact that the commentators' praise and criticism of this Rule
focus primarily on the benefits and dangers of a broad review.
3 1. See supra note 22.
32. Professor William Blume, in Blume, supra note 18, at 71-72, expresses the position of
committee members and commentators who approved of Rule 68. Blume advocates that a
broad "equity" review would provide an extra safeguard against incorrect decisions, encourage
trial judges to exercise greater care in making fact findings and enhance public confidence in
the courts. Blume emphatically stated: "A sure way to arouse distrust and suspicion in the
public mind is to give the district judge final power over life, liberty or property." Id. at 71.
33. Other commentators and Committee members advocated a narrower review. Dean
Charles Clark, reporter for the Committee, and Professor William Stone, Committee member,
insisted that a broad equity review would increase the number of appeals and reversals,
1214 [Vol. 62:1209
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Confronted by controversy, the Committee retreated and spent three years
examining the procedures for appellate review in various states and soliciting
the advice of lawyers, judges and commentators. 4 In 1937, the Committee
submitted to the Supreme Court Rule 52(a). The Court accepted the Rule,
the Attorney General submitted it to Congress, and it became effective in
1938. 31 The new rule stated then, as now: "[flindings of fact ... shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." '36
II. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF A NEW RULE
A. Rule 52(a) Proves Ambiguous
At first glance, Rule 52(a) appeared to quell the uncertainty of appellate
review by silencing the dispute between law and equity. Later, court decisions
revealed troubling ambiguities within the Rule. The term "clearly erroneous"
appeared to be a vague modification of the former law and equity review
standards. Basically, a "clearly erroneous" standard implied considerable
appellate court deference to trial court fact findings; the appellate court
would reverse these findings only when the evidence did not reasonably
support the trial court's fact decisions. Judge Learned Hand, in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,37 offered a general guideline for ap-
plication of the "clearly erroneous" review standard:
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase 'clearly erroneous';
all that can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will
hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an adminis-
frustrating the goal of simplicity. Clark & Stone, supra note 6, at 217.
Judge Chesnut urged that broad review would "tend to derogate from the importance of
... [the trial judge's] judicial function." Chesnut emphasized that the trial judge's chance to
observe the trial provided an added opportunity for the trial judge to make a better decision.
Chesnut, supra note 22, at 540.
Judge Wright feared that a reversal by judges who had not observed the witnesses and the
trial would threaten, not protect, just results. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751, 762-63 (1957).
34. R. FosuSTER, supra note 22, at 548:
After almost three years of incessant toil, in the course of which a thorough and
painstaking study was made of the best features of the legal procedure in the
various states and in England and an opportunity was extended to all bar asso-
ciations and to individual lawyers to offer criticisms and suggestions, the Com-
mittee, in the autumn of 1937, submitted to the Supreme Court a draft of the
proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
35. Id. at 548-49.
36. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
121519871
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
trative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly
and only when well persuaded.,8
Many courts accepted this basic standard, but appeared uncertain about
the type of fact finding to which this standard should apply. Courts exper-
imented with different approaches until, over time, three strikingly different
patterns of appellate fact review appeared. Under one approach, the courts
applied the "clearly erroneous" standard to all types of evidence. 39 Under
another, the "gloss" approach, courts applied the pure "clearly erroneous"
standard to facts based on oral evidence. For facts based on documentary
evidence, they applied a "watered-down" version of the clearly erroneous
standard, and, while they did not use de novo review of facts based on
documentary evidence, they did review these facts more freely than they
would under the strict clearly erroneous standard. 40 Under a third approach,
the Orvis approach, courts applied the "clearly erroneous" standard only
to findings based on oral evidence, and reviewed documentary evidence" de
novo.
41
B. Two New Approaches to Rule 52(a) Review
1. The Gloss Approach
The gloss approach, an early interpretation of Rule 52(a), arose from the
following confusing passage within the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule
52(a): "The rule stated in the third section of Subdivision (a) accords with
the decisions on the scope of review in modern federal equity practice." 42
This statement evoked confusion since equity courts in the past had applied
a diversity of standards, including de novo review, free review of facts based
on documentary or undisputed evidence, and a "clearly erroneous" standard
for all evidence. 43 The words of the rule dispelled the possibility of complete
de novo review, 44 and another passage in the Advisory Committee's Notes
dismissed the possibility of different types of review for disputed and un-
38. Id. at 433.
39. See Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules
Committee, 7 VAD. L. REv. 521, 535 (1954).
40. Judge Clark and Judge Wright coined the term "gloss approach." For a description
of this approach, see Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 505-06 (1950); Wright, supra note 39, at 533-34.
41. For a description of the Orvis approach, see generally Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537
(2d Cir. 1950).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note.
43. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
44. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ...." FED. R. CrV.
P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
1216 [Vol. 62:1209
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disputed evidence.4 - Two basic standards of review remained plausible: a
"clearly erroneous" standard for all evidence, or a standard with broader
review for documentary evidence.
a. Supreme Court Cases Use the Gloss Approach
Supreme Court interpretations of Rule 52(a) heightened the uncertainty
surrounding the rule. In Baumgartner v. United States,46 the Court hinted
that the oral and documentary distinction might wield significant control
over the scope of appellate fact review: "The conclusiveness of a 'finding
of fact' depends on the nature of the materials on which the finding is
based." 47 A subsequent case, United States v. United States Gypsum,4 8 ar-
guably supported the oral and documentary distinction. In Gypsum, the
defendant industries appealed a charge that they had violated the Sherman
Act through a plan involving patent licensing in a conspiracy to restrain the
gypsum trade.4 9 In court, the defendants denied the conspiracy. Documents,
however, including the licensing agreement and bulletins from defendants'
meetings contradicted the oral testimony.50 The trial court granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss. On review, the Supreme Court struck down the
trial court's holding. The Court discredited the witness testimony. Justice
Reed, speaking for the majority, explained: "Where such testimony is in
conflict with contemporaneous documents we can give it little weight, par-
ticularly when the crucial issues involve mixed questions of law and fact."'
This holding could support a different standard of review for oral and
documentary evidence. Or, as one commentator pointed out, it could also
45. This passage explained that the clearly erroneous standard "is applicable to all classes
of findings in cases tried without a jury whether the finding is of a fact concerning which there
was conflict of testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testimony."
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note.
46. 322 U.S. 665 (1944). In this case, the appellate court had sustained the district court's
holding that deprived Baumgartner of his American citizenship under the claim that, at his
naturalization oath ten years earlier, he had not fully renounced his loyalty to Germany and
transferred his loyalty to America. The lower courts based their decisions on the defendant's
subsequent declarations about his loyalty to the Nazi party and the superiority of the German
people. The Supreme Court stated that the first amendment protected the speech of naturalized
and natural born citizens equally, so that the defendant's declarations alone could not cause
Baumgartner to forfeit his citizenship. The Court held that the plaintiff (the defendant here)
presented no sufficient evidence of Baumgartner's disloyalty or fraud at the time he took the
naturalization oath.
47. Id. at 670-71. This quote may be dicta since the Supreme Court did not appear to use
the oral and documentary evidence distinction to attempt to justify using independent review,
and instead seemed to base its independent review on the character of the evidence, its broad
social value, and its implication of important first amendment principles.
48. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
49. Id. at 364-65.
50. Id. at 393-96.
51. Id. at 395-96.
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support the narrower interpretation that a court could ignore self-serving
oral testimony when that testimony contradicted documents prepared by the
same witnesses.5 2 Appellate courts predictably interpreted the holding both
ways, widening the rift between the standards of review.
b. Commentators Discuss the Gloss Approach
Commentators' opinions reflected the appellate courts' divisions between
the "clearly erroneous" approach and the gloss approach. Some commen-
tators supported the gloss approach,53 while others preferred general appli-
cation of the "clearly erroneous" rule.5 4 No irreparable chasm had yet
developed, however, between the two views. Even commentators who ad-
vocated the "clearly erroneous" standard accepted, reluctantly, the gloss
approach. As one explained, "This was perhaps not harmful, though to add
an additional measure of discretion to a rule calling for the exercise of
discretion was, if not confusing, at least gilding the lily." 55
2. The Orvis Approach
a. Judge Frank Develops the Orvis Approach
The gloss approach was expanded dramatically by one judge's interpre-
tation of Gypsum. Judge Frank, in Orvis v. Higgins,5 6 used Gypsum to
develop a two-part formula to govern the scope of appellate review of trial
court fact findings. First, if the trial court based the fact finding on purely
documentary evidence, or on a mixture of documentary and oral evidence
with the balance toward documentary, the appellate judge could make a
new finding of fact and disregard the trial court's findings, since both courts
52. Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or
Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506, 523 (1963).
53. See 3 J. MooRE & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at § 52.01. For Moore's more recent
analysis and support of a different scope of review for oral and documentary evidence, see 5A
J. MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.04 (2d ed. 1982).
54. Clark, supra note 40, at 505; Wright, supra note 39, at 533-35.
55. Clark, supra note 40, at 505.
56. 180 F.2d 537. In this case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's holding that a
husband and wife had not intended to create reciprocal trusts, and hence these trust funds
were not includable in the husband's gross estate.
1218 [Vol. 62:1209
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had equal opportunity to examine the evidence. 57 If the fact finding rested
on purely oral evidence or a mixture of oral and documentary evidence with
the balance toward the oral testimony, the appellate court, having a limited
ability to examine witnesses' demeanor, could reverse the trial court's fact
findings "only in the most unusual circumstances. '58
b. Commentators Discuss the Orvis Approach
Judge Frank's novel approach further divided the commentators. Some
approved Judge Frank's derivations. They believed that a broader appellate
review would increase correct decisions, encourage trial court care in fact
findings, and elevate public confidence in the fairness of court decisions.59
Others, including some who tolerated the gloss approach, vehemently op-
posed this new interpretation. They insisted that the freer review would
multiply the number of appeals, decrease public confidence in lower courts'
decisions, lower the morale of trial judges, restrict trial courts to a role of
merely determining witness credibility, and lead to a lack of uniformity and
finality of decisions.60
C. Rule 52(a) Review: Three Standards Evoke Confusion in the
Courts
Supreme Court cases coming after the Gypsum and Orvis cases appeared
to fluctuate between the three standards: the Orvis approach, the gloss
approach, and the "clearly erroneous" review. In United States v. General
Motors,61 the Court appeared to shift toward the gloss approach and the
Orvis approach by implying that appellate courts could review documentary
57. Judge Frank explained:
Where a trial judge sits without a jury, the rule varies with the character of the
evidence: (a) if he decides a fact issue on written evidence alone, we [the Court
of Appeals] are as able as he [the trial court] to determine credibility, and so we
may disregard his finding. (b) Where evidence is partly oral and the balance is
written or deals with undisputed facts, then we may ignore the trial judge's finding
and substitute our own, (1) if the written evidence or some undisputed fact renders
credibility of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, or (2) if the trial judge's
finding must rest exclusively on the written evidence or the undisputed facts, so
that his evaluation of credibility has no significance.
Id. at 539.
58. Judge Frank stated: "But where the evidence supporting his [the trial judge's] finding
as to any fact issue is entirely oral testimony, we [the Court of Appeals] may disturb that
finding only in the most unusual circumstances." Id. at 539-40.
59. 5A J. MooRE, supra note 53, at § 52.04.
60. Wright, supra note 39, at 534-35; Clark, supra note 40, at 506, observed: "Hence we
have the rule so overturned that 'when the appellate court wishes to apply the policy of
nonreviewability of the original rule, it finds it necessary to utter an apology for seeming to
violate the rule of case law."
61. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
19871 1219
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
evidence more freely than oral evidence. The Court reversed a trial court's
decision, concluding that defendant automobile dealers conspired to restrain
trade:
Moreover, the trial court's customary opportunity to evaluate the de-
meanor and thus the credibility of the witnesses, which is the rationale
behind Rule 52(a) . . . plays only a restricted role here. This was es-
sentially a 'paper case.' It did not unfold by the testimony of 'live'
witnesses.62
Other cases were less certain. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc.,63 the Court made some statements that can be read to support the
gloss and Orvis approaches, 64 and other statements that seem to support the
"clearly erroneous" approach. 6
1. The Supreme Court Begins to Accept the "Clearly Erroneous"
Standard
In later cases, the Court moved toward application of the "clearly erro-
neous" review to all types of evidence. In Inwood Laboratories v. Ives
Laboratories," evidence of whether a generic drug manufacturer had inten-
tionally induced manufacturers into mislabeling certain drugs consisted pri-
marily of documentary evidence: advertisements, descriptions of the drug's
appearance, and statistics about mislabeling. Both the appellate court and
the trial court could examine the evidence equally well. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court denounced the appellate court's broad review of the fact
findings, saying:
By rejecting the District Court's findings simply because it would have
given more weight to evidence of mislabeling than did the trial court,
the Court of Appeals clearly erred. Determining the weight and credibility
of the evidence is the special province of the trier of fact. Because the
trial court's findings concerning the significance of the instances of
mislabeling were not clearly erroneous, they should not have been dis-
turbed. 67
62. Id. at 129 & n.16. Only three witnesses appeared in person, so the relevant evidence
was almost wholly documentary.
63. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part the appellate court's holding that plaintiff patentee had joined in a patent pool in a
conspiracy to exclude defendant from the Canadian, English and Australian markets.
64. Id. at 122-23. The Court criticized the appellate court for giving less weight than the
trial court gave to the witness testimony. This can be interpreted to suggest that appellate
courts should give oral evidence special deference, as the gloss and Orvis approaches advocate.
65. Id. at 123. The Court warned, "In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the
findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind
that their function is not to decide cases de novo." Id. This warning could apply equally to
oral and documentary evidence.
66. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
67. Id. at 856.
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In another recent case, Pullman-Standard v. Swint,6 the Court specified
that the "clearly erroneous" standard did not exclude certain categories of
fact.6 9 The Court, however, intended this statement to resolve another dis-
tinction, and did not specifically apply this statement to the oral and doc-
umentary distinction.70
2. Circuit Courts Fluctuate Between the Three Standards
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court was moving toward one standard
of review, the "clearly erroneous" standard, the circuit courts remained
divided between the three standards of review. As seen, some courts applied
the "clearly erroneous" standard to all types of evidence. Other courts used
a modified "clearly erroneous" standard, resembling the gloss approach,
for all fact findings. Still other courts adopted a de novo review of docu-
mentary evidence under the Orvis approach. Some circuits fluctuated between
different standards while others appeared more stable."' Even within the
more settled circuits, however, a substantial number of decisions deviated
from the prevailing standard. 72 There was no uniform application of Rule
52(a). A change to establish one -uniform standard of review under Rule
52(a) was needed.
III. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City OFFERS A SOLUTION
A. Anderson Establishes "'Clearly Erroneous" Review for All
Fact Finding
In March, 1985, the Supreme Court decided Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City.73 This case arose as a straightforward Title VII employment discrim-
68. 456 U.S. 273 (1982). In this case, the Court found that the differential impact of
defendant (plaintiff here) employer's promotion and seniority system did not contain discrim-
inatory intent necessary for a Title VII violation. The Court did not rely on the oral and
documentary evidence distinction for its decision.
69. Id. at 287. The Court stated: "Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain
categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district
court's finding unless clearly erroneous." Id.
70. The Court dealt with the ultimate and subsidiary fact distinction. See infra notes 143-
50 and accompanying text.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note (1985 amendment). This advisory note
describes and provides examples of the different standards in order to explain an important
reason for amending the rule. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
72. For an example of this variation in the Sixth Circuit, see generally Solomon, Appellate
Fact Review Under Rule 52(a): An Analysis and Critique of Sixth Circuit Precedent, 16 U.
TOL. L. REv. 667 (1985).
73. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
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ination case.74 Plaintiff Anderson claimed the committee representing Bes-
semer City refused to hire her as a city recreational director solely because
of her sex. The district court based its finding for the plaintiff on several
factors examined at the trial. 75 First, the court found that at her interview
for the position, committee members had asked her if she realized that the
job involved night work and how her husband felt about her application
for the job. Other applicants were not asked similar questions. 76 These
findings evolved from conflicting testimony. Nichols, a committee member,
reported that the committee had asked all the job candidates about night
work.77 Boone, the only female committee member, said that the committee
had not seriously questioned the other applicants about night work. She said
that these questions to Anderson annoyed her. She claimed that, to express
her irritation, she "facetiously" referred to night work and asked Kincaid,
the successful applicant, "and your new bride won't mind? ' 78 Butler, another
member, remembered that the committee had asked Anderson these ques-
tions, and had also asked Kincaid "in a way."279
The court found Anderson better qualified than Kincaid for the respon-
sibilities of a community recreation director. Anderson's qualifications in-
cluded a diversity of activities in recreation, teaching, management and
planning with various community groups, while Kincaid's qualifications cen-
tered around traditional team sports.80 The trial judge looked at several
committee members' out-of-court and in-court statements which implied that
a woman should not hold the position.8 ' The court dismissed defendants'
contention that Kincaid offered a superior program; from the trial testimony
of Anderson and Kincaid, the court found the programs to be substantially
similar.12 Based on all of these factors, the court held that the committee
refused to hire Anderson, the better qualified candidate, solely because of
her sex. 3
74. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 557 F. Supp. 412 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 717 F.2d 149
(4th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
75. Id. at 414-18.
76. Id. at 416.
77. Id. at 414.
78. Id. at 413-14.
79. Kincaid, the successful applicant, could not remember being asked about night work,
but did remember commenting about it. Id. at 414.
80. The district court noted that Kincaid had a degree in recreation and Anderson did not,
but felt Anderson's general qualifications better suited the needs of a recreation director's job.
Id. at 414-16.
81. Id. at 417. Committee member Nichols testified at trial that "it would have been real
hard" for a woman to hold the position. He also spoke of the night work required, and
commented, "my wife should be at home at night." This statement could imply a general
belief that women with husbands, like Anderson, should not hold a job involving extensive
night work. Id. at 416.
82. Id. at 416.
83. The court also took into consideration the fact that the committee, while soliciting
applications, had only invited men to apply for the job. Id. at 417.
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The defendants then appealed, and the appellate court overturned the trial
court's fact findings.14 The appellate court examined both applicants' qual-
ifications for the job, and found Kincaid's superior to Anderson's. 5 The
court found the question of night work related to the job requirements and
therefore acceptable.8 6 The court said that nothing in the record supported
Boone's contention of the "facetiousness" of her question to Kincaid about
night work. 7 Finally, the court found that the committee members displayed
no prejudice toward a woman as recreation director. The court supported
that finding by pointing out that the male committee members had working
wives, which, according to the court, dispelled the challenge of discriminatory
motive.8
The Supreme Court could easily have overturned this case without touching
the Rule 52(a) controversy. The case fit neatly into the traditional incorrect
reversal: the trial court had used witness testimony substantially in forming
its decision, and many of the key points of the testimony, such as the
facetiousness of Boone's question, depended on witness demeanor for an
accurate appraisal.8 9 Even when documentary evidence supported a decision
on an issue such as proof of the parties' qualifications, the Court's decision
depended on a choice between two equally permissible views; neither up-
holding or rejecting Anderson's contention would have been a clearly er-
roneous trial court decision with these facts.90
84. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 564
(1985).
85. Id. at 155.
86. The appellate court emphasized Kincaid's college courses dealing with athletics, teaching
sports and organizing physical education programs. The court also mentioned that Kincaid's
experiences with athletics were all recent, while some of Anderson's work experience occurred
at an earlier date. Id. at 151-52.
87. Id. at 155.
88. Id. at 155 n.5.
89. A portion of Boone's in-court interrogation, reprinted in Anderson, 470 U.S. at 578
n.3, shows the importance of demeanor toward ascertaining the nature of Boone's remark.
Before she was asked these questions, Boone stated that no committee member had asked
the male candidates about night work "in the context that they [these questions] were asked
of Phyllis." Boone added, "I don't know whether they were worried because Jim wasn't going
to get his supper or what." The lawyer's questions then continued:
A: [Boone]: You asked if there was any question asked about-I think Donnie
[Kincaid] was just married, and I think I made a comment to him personally-
and your new bride won't mind.
Q: [attorney]: So, you asked him yourself about his own wife's reaction?
A: No, no.
Id.
90. The Court aptly explained the situation; neither the district court nor the appellate court
made a clearly erroneous fact finding, but "[tlhe question we must answer ... is not whether
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the facts was clearly erroneous, but whether the District
Court's finding was clearly erroneous." Id. at 577.
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The Court, however, was worried about the current confusion surrounding
Rule 52(a), and used this case to attempt to resolve it. After duly overturning
the appellate court's reversal and reinstating the trial court's decision, 9' the
Court tackled the documentary and oral evidence distinction. Recognizing
the split among the circuits caused by the gloss and Orvis approaches, the
Court expressly disapproved of Orvis, saying "it is impossible to trace the
theory's lineage back to the text of Rule 52 ... ,"92 The Court cited Pullman
to assert that no type of facts evidence embodied an exception to Rule
52(a). 93 The Court then explained:
The trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with
experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only
negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion
of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have
already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on per-
suading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the current one;
requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is
requiring too much.-
Under Anderson, the gloss approach and the Orvis approach retreated, and
the "clearly erroneous" standard for all evidence prevailed. 9
B. Benefits of Anderson
Anderson affects Rule 52(a) in three significant ways. First, Anderson
offers an immediate, significant benefit to the courts; as the overruled circuits
change their standards to conform with the "clearly erroneous" rule for all
evidence, uniformity between the circuits will increase. The Second Circuit
illustrates the immediate impact of Anderson. In Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard
91. Id.
92. Id. at 574.
93. Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)).
94. Id. at 574-75.
95. In a recent case, Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 106 S. Ct. 1527 (1986), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Anderson rule. In this case, the Supreme Court overturned an
appellate court's finding, labeling a question about the content of barge workers' jobs, which
determined their eligibility for protection under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a question of
fact not open to independent appellate review. The Court then summarized the proper scope
of appellate review:
If the Court of Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make
findings of fact essential to a proper resolution of the legal question, it should
have remanded to the District Court to make those findings. If it was of the view
that the findings of the District Court were 'clearly erroneous' within the meaning
of Rule 52(a), it could have set them aside on that basis. If it believed that the
District Court's factual findings were unassailable, but that the proper rule of
law was misapplied to those findings, it could have reversed the District Court's




& Service Co.,96 the concurring judge noted that Anderson prevented the
Second Circuit from applying its former de novo review of documentary
evidence. Instead, the Second Circuit applied the clearly erroneous review,
as would every circuit after Anderson.w
Second, trial judges now know the degree of review with which appellate
courts must scrutinize trial judges' fact findings. The trial judges will Work
with caution, knowing that the appellate courts will overturn incorrect,
unreasonable decisions. They will also know that if they arrive at a "rea-
sonable" decision, an appellate court cannot use the oral and documentary
evidence distinction to overturn the decision simply because the appellate
court disagrees with it. The trial judge's fact findings will gain a greater
degree of finality than under the former system, where appellate courts too
often switched standards of review to arrive at a desired result.9 The change
wrought by Anderson will undoubtedly elevate the trial judges' morale. 9
Third, litigants now know that the appellate courts will always uge the
"clearly erroneous" standard for fact review despite the character of the
evidence. They can more efficiently prepare their appeals. Formerly, the
numerous standards and the uncertainty about how the courts would apply
the standards encouraged litigants to appeal fact findings as a matter of
course, hoping the appellate courts would choose a lenient standard of
review.1° A district judge, drawing from his own experiences, shrewdly
commented:
The credibility of the trial judges is being challenged and the attorneys
have consistently told me in recent years that they automatically appeal
because they "get two bites out of the apple." They not only get a ruling
by the trial court but they get a good chance of getting a trial de novo
in the appellate court as well because of the appellate court's failure to
recognize the clearly erroneous rule and apply it. °10
With Anderson, litigants will not appeal to obtain de novo fact review or
review under the gloss approach. At an individual level, this will save time
96. 760 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1985). See also infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
97. Other circuits have also noted the change. In Ginsu Prods. Inc. v. Dart Indus., Inc.,
786 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1986), the appellate court, in referring to the Anderson rule, rejected
Ginsu's claim that it should review the evidence independently because the evidence consisted
of documents, not witness testimony. See also In re Allustiarte, 786 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986).
98. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
99. Before the adoption of Rule 52(a), Judge Chesnut had feared that broad fact review
would threaten the prestige and morale of the federal trial judge. Chesnut, supra note 22, at
538.
100. Nangle, The Ever-Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Cases-Is the
"Clearly Erroneous" Rule Being Avoided?, 59 VAsH. U.L.Q. 409, 417-21 (1981). Nangle, a
district judge, points out that the uncertainty permitted appellate judges to alter the standards
of appeal to "do justice," (to assure the result that the appellate judge felt was best). This
gave trial judges little guidance or assurance about when they could reasonably believe they
reached a final decision at the trial level.
101. Id. at 410 (Letter from Hon. Andrew Bogue, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota, to Honorable Judge Nangle (April 19, 1979)).
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and money for litigants, and will allow appellate judges to concentrate on
matters of law and on clearly erroneous fact decisions. 10 2
At a broader level, the change caused by Anderson could conceivably
decrease the number of appeals, or at the least, the time spent in each appeal
trying to persuade the appellate judge to review a reasonable fact decision
de novo. In recent years the caseload in the appellate courts has expanded
dramatically. 03 Commentators, judges, lawyers, and Supreme Court Justices
have expressed alarm over the difficulties that this expansion foreseeably
precipitates. 104 Appellate judges may find themselves unable to maintain high
quality work under the increasing time pressure. This quality, in turn, will
become more important as the Supreme Court caseload expands, preventing
it from reviewing issues of national importance, placing these issues in the
hands of the appellate courts. 0 5 Experts have debated various proposals for
alleviating the caseload growth, including establishing a national court of
appeals,' °6 increasing the number of courts, increasing the number of judges
and staff at the appellate level, 0 7 and instituting methods of certiorari case
acceptance. 08 No proposal is ready for immediate enactment, however, as
each one evokes fears of an increase in appellate court bureaucratization or
a decrease in uniformity. 1' 9 Anderson, having established a more uniform
standard of review for fact decisions, should discourage automatic fact
appeals. It will encourage appeals only on legal questions or for fact findings
that could plausibly be "clearly erroneous." Through this, Anderson will
play a role in confronting the urgent problem of the caseload explosion.
Anderson, therefore, contains noteworthy benefits.
102. Griswold, supra note 22, at 808.
103. See Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction and a Proposed Course of
Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 617, 617-20; Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in
the Federal Appellate System, 11 HAsTinos CONST. L.Q. 457, 459-60 (1984).
104. See Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior and Workload of Federal
Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1983); Mills, Caseload Explosion: The Appellate Response,
16 J. MARSHALL L. RaV. 1, 1-3 (1982).
105. See Thompson, supra note 103, at 464-66. Thompson points out that signs of strain
and overwork appear in modern Supreme Court opinions. These signs include the increasing
length of the opinions and lists of cited cases, suggesting a greater reliance on court clerks to
prepare opinions. Likewise, the number of concurring opinions suggests that the justices have
less time to confer until they can compromise.
106. Id. at 474-503.
107. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 840, 1023-30 (1984). For a discussion of the
benefits and difficulties of increasing the judges, courts and staff, see generally Auerbach, The
Unconstitutionality of Congressional Proposals to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 47
Mo. L. Rav. 47 (1982), and Wasby, Appellate Delay: An Examination of Possible Remedies,
6 JusT. Sys. J. 325 (1981).
108. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985).
109. See Posner, Will the Federal Court of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Relegation of Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 761, 768-74 (1983);




C. Anderson is Codified: An Amendment to Rule 52(a)
A recent amendment to Rule 52(a) codified part of the Anderson decision.
This amendment reads: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or docu-
mentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses."" 0 The Advisory Committee mentioned several
benefits of this amendment, and these benefits mirrored the ones outlined
in Anderson: greater uniformity in the circuits, less conflict between the
circuits, and closer heed to the words of the rule by the courts. The Com-
mittee also mentioned stability, judicial economy, a lessening of appeals,
and retention of fact finding power in its proper place, the trial courts.
Therefore, Anderson and the amendment eliminate the oral and documentary
distinction to the benefit of courts and litigants."'
IV. ANDERSON V. CITY OF BESSEMER CITY STOPS SHORT OF A
COMPLETE SOLUTION
A. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard: Still Vague After
Anderson
1. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard: Historically Vague
Anderson definitely improves the former Rule 52(a) review, yet the im-
provement is incomplete. Several significant problems remain. The most
obvious problem in Anderson is that a "clearly erroneous" decision is
difficult to define. 2 The Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance in
early cases, but its definitions, while helpful, did not add specificity to this
discretionary standard. In one earlier case, United States v. Yellow Cab
Co.,"' the Court pointed out that a trial court's rejection of one permissible
view of the evidence in favor of another permissible view did not constitute
a clearly erroneous fact finding. The appellate court's preference for a
different view did not entitle that court to reverse the trial court's decision." 4
The Court also stated in United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards,"' "[I]t is not enough that we might give the facts another construc-
110. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) (as amended Aug. 1, 1985).
111. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) (1985) advisory committee's note.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
113. 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
114. Id. at 341-42.
115. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
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tion, resolve the ambiguities differently, and find a more sinister cast to
actions which the District Court apparently deemed innocent."" 6
The Court offered another definition in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co." 7 "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ' " 8
These definitions appear logical, but the difference between a "disagreement
with a permissible interpretation" of evidence and a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed" proves elusive when appellate
courts deal with specific fact situations. This standard in itself has proved
workable, but its ambiguities show that any possible alteration of the stand-
ard needs to establish more clarity, not more confusion, in the scope of
review.
2. Anderson Fails to Clarify the Standard Sufficiently
Anderson adds confusion to the issue of what constitutes a "clearly er-
roneous" fact finding. The Anderson Court reaffirmed earlier definitions
of the "clearly erroneous" rule," 9 yet the Court also stated: "If the district
court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in
its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it ..... '20 In this context,
an appellate court could interpret these words as a reaffirmation of the
former "clearly erroneous" standard. An appellate court, however, could
also interpret this phrase to allow only an extremely deferential review of
trial court fact decisions rather than merely a cautious review. Since the trial
courts invariably frame their facts in a fashion most supportive to their
holdings, a trial court's fact findings seldom appear "implausible" in the
light of all the evidence. Justice Powell, in his Anderson concurrence, aptly
warned that this narrow interpretation could give a trial court almost com-
plete discretion in fact finding, removing even minimal checks against the
trial judge's power in fact finding.' 2' Anderson, Powell feared, "may en-
courage overburdened Courts of Appeals simply to apply Rule 52(a) in a
conclusory fashion, rather than to undertake the type of burdensome review
that may be appropriate in some cases."' 2 One commentator notes that such
narrow appellate fact review appears to correlate with fact review in jury
116. Id. at 495.
117. 333 U.S. 364 (1948). See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
118. 333 U.S. at 395.
119. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). For example, the
Court mentioned the "definite and firm conviction" of a mistake test from Gypsum, 333 U.S.
at 394-95.
120. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74.




cases, but actually increases the difference between the two types of cases.
In jury cases, twelve jury members examine the facts, and the trial judge
may then examine the result to assure that it does not contradict the evi-
dence.'2 In bench trials, a narrow standard of fact review would render fact
determinations completely within the discretion of one judge. This could
leave an unjust result completely unchecked.
The extensive trial court discretion, described in the narrow interpretation
of Anderson, is most striking in cases involving a fact decision which is
"plausible" but questionable in terms of public policy or the effect on
subsequent cases.'2 Under the narrow interpretation of Anderson, the ap-
pellate court could not overturn such a case. If the decision is upheld,
however, this type of fact decision could become damaging precedent and
have an unfavorable effect on future cases.
In addition, the Anderson Court also stated, "When findings are based
on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52 demands
even greater deference to the trial court's findings .. ".. ,,2s This statement
about review of facts based on witness testimony opens Anderson to several
conflicting interpretations. 26 One commentator feels that this allows appellate
courts to continue to use the gloss approach.2 7 The Supreme Court's firm
123. Blume, supra note 18, at 70-72. Blume spoke of this uneven review in the context of
the Rule 68 controversy, but his words aptly suggest a problem with narrowing Rule 52(a) to
allow trial judges overly extensive discretion in fact finding.
124. This issue arose in a recent case, County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 106 S. Ct. 300
(1985). Here, plaintiff Kling claimed she was denied admittance to nursing school because of
a handicap. The district court denied her claim, but the appellate court found this decision
clearly erroneous, noting that the nursing school physician had stated that if he had given
plaintiff an individual examination rather than simply considering general facts about her illness,
he would have been "strongly swayed" toward admitting her. Kling v. County of Los Angeles,
769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 300 (1985).
The Supreme Court summarily overruled the appellate court, saying the district court decision
was not clearly erroneous. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, said the Supreme Court should
have examined the facts more carefully, and, in passing, quoted the appellate court: "It is
precisely this type of general assumption about a handicapped person's ability that section 504
was designed to avoid." Kling, 106 S. Ct. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Kling, 769
F.2d 532, 534, and referring to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794).
125. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.
126. The Court did provide limited guidance; the Court said that if documentary evidence
contradicted the witness' testimony, or if it proved internally inconsistent or implausible, the
appellate court could overturn the trial court's fact decision which relied on witness credibility.
Id. If, however, the district court made a choice between two plausible interpretations, the
finding "virtually never" can be error. Id. This provides some guidance, but still leaves Anderson
open to several interpretations.
127. Note, supra note 22, at 261. The author stated: "While courts will no longer employ
a de novo standard of review, courts may and should continue to employ both a modified
clearly erroneous standard of review and the traditional clearly erroneous standard of review."
Id. The author did not mention Anderson, which had not reached the Supreme Court at the
time the Note was published. The author, however, analyzed the amendment to Rule 52(a),




affirmation that appellate courts must review oral and documentary evidence
under the "clearly erroneous" standard' 28 renders this claim unconvincing.
Other interpretations suggest that this deference places appellate fact review
based on witness credibility in the same category as appellate review of jury
fact findings. The statement can also be interpreted to reinforce the Supreme
Court's assertion that the "clearly erroneous" review must apply to all fact
findings; fact findings based on witness testimony may simply require a
slightly more careful application of the rule.
3. Appellate Courts Reflect This Vagueness
Appellate cases after Anderson are not uniform. Some cases apply An-
derson properly. 129 Others exercise broad appellate review, despite Ander-
son. 30 For example, in Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 3 , a Title
VII discrimination case, the trial court found that defendant fired plaintiff
because of her sex. This case involved contradictory testimony. Plaintiff
claimed her conflict with her supervisor arose because of his discriminatory
attitude. Defendant asserted that the supervisor's reasonable requests had
evoked plaintiff's irrational refusal to cooperate. 32 The appellate court re-
versal, as shown by its holding, reasonably interpreted the facts. The trial
court's interpretation, however, appears reasonable as well. The appellate
court cited Anderson, 133 but then noted Justice Powell's concurring statement
that some fact situations compel review of the entire record. 34 The appellate
court said: "We find that the present case is one in which such review is
128. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-75.
129. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986):
It is commonplace that findings other than those of the trial judge might find
some support in the record, or that the reviewing judges if sitting at trial might
have reached such other findings. It is therefore ineffective on appeal merely to
present a scenario in which the trial judge could have gone appellant's way....
The rules governing appellate review thus require affirmance of judgments based
on findings made without ... reversible error.
Id. at 1558 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
130. See Jorgensen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 761 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985). This case
hinges on a choice between two equally plausible views about whether age discrimination was
the reason for an older salesman's dismissal. The appellate court, by replacing one reasonable
position with another, seems to have applied an overly broad interpretation of Anderson.
131. 764 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1244 (1986). In another case, Avis
Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1986) the court broadly
reviewed the facts. Hertz had advertised: "Hertz has more new cars than Avis has cars." Since
Avis had more sale and rental cars than Hertz, the district court found this claim false. The
appellate court reversed, saying Hertz had more rental cars than Avis, and asserting that the
advertisement applied only to rental cars. Both interpretations appear equally plausible.
132. Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 177-78. This proves to be a very "close" case, but in light of
the ambiguous situation and conflicting evidence, it would be difficult to label the trial court's
holding "clearly erroneous."
133. Id. at 178.
134. Id. at 178-79.
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appropriate."'' 5 Without any explanation as to why the facts in this case
differed from other fact situations, the court proceeded to review the entire
record.
Other cases give stricter deference to the trial courts. 3 6 In many cases,
strict deference is proper. In some, however, a trial court decision might be
plausible, yet still questionable in terms of public policy. For example, using
the "clearly erroneous" standard, an appellate court allowed a questionable
holding in Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil and Service Co. 13 7 The trial court
had held that a very tenuous contract was enforceable. The appellate court
was unable to find the holding "clearly erroneous," and so it upheld the
holding.' 38 The court implied that this decision might have an adverse effect
both on the parties' rights and on public policy:
[W]e recognize that we are permitting a substantial transaction to be
consummated on fragmentary conversation and documentation. How-
ever, it is the practice in many fields to transact business quickly and
with a minimum of documentation, and the expert testimony indicates
that purchasing oil wholesale is one such field. Parties doing business
with each other in such circumstances take the risk that their conflicting
versions of conversations will be resolved to their disfavor by a fact-
finder whose findings, even if incorrect, are immune from appellate
revision. 19
Anderson therefore creates two problems. First, Anderson leaves the "clearly
erroneous" standard open to several interpretations, thereby decreasing uni-
formity in an area that urgently needs a uniform scope of application.
Second, a possible interpretation of Rule 52(a) suggests a review which is
so narrow that it deprives trial court fact decisions of almost any review at
the appellate level, Both of these problems threaten the clear, effective
appellate fact review Anderson attempted to achieve.
135. Id. at 179.
136. In Friends v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 759 F.2d 813,814 (10th Cir. 1985), the appellate
court cited Anderson to sustain the trial court's holding in a discriminatory discharge case.
The appellate court explained that it was "not at liberty to overturn those findings if they are
supported, as we find they are, by the record." Id.
In cases like this, the deference to the trial court appears valid. In other cases, however, an
extreme deference might sanction questionable decisions.
137. 760 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1985). This "contract" consisted of phone conversations, telex
messages and a Product Purchase Agreement. The Purchase Agreement would normally permit
a statutory "merchant's exemption" to the Statute of Frauds unwritten contract provision. The
buyer had not returned the agreement, however, which raises questions about both parties'
intent in this case. The decision did not appear "clearly erroneous." Sufficient evidence sup-
ported the claim that the parties had a contract; nevertheless, the contract was uncertain enough
so it appeared to leave the appellate court slightly troubled about its decision.
138. Id. at 422.
139. Id. at 423.
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B. The Law and Fact Distinction Problem is Ignored in Anderson
A second major difficulty with Anderson involves a formerly troublesome
area which Anderson neglected to combat: the distinction between questions
of law and questions of fact. At the most basic level, fact questions involve
events connected to a specific case.1 40 Questions of law involve general legal
standards applicable to all cases.' 41 However, questions about the application
of a general legal standard to a specific set of facts, often called "fact
application" questions, could fit in either the "law" or "fact" category. 142
Courts are therefore uncertain about the proper standard of review for "fact
application" questions. Should they be reviewed as questions of law, or as
questions of fact under Rule 52(a)?
1. History of the Fact Application Problem
The difficulty in determining whether fact application should be reviewed
as law or fact arose in Baumgartner v. United States. 43 The Baumgartner
Court reviewed a lower court's fact finding that defendant committed fraud
when he took a naturalization oath.'4 The Court disagreed with the appellate
court's use of Rule 52(a) to review this question of fact. The Court found
that this question of fact deserved a broader and more exacting scope of
review because it involved an "ultimate fact.' 14 The Court noted that an
"ultimate fact ... implies the application of standards of law."' 46 The Court
defined "ultimate fact":
Though labeled "finding of fact," it may involve the very basis on which
judgment of fallible evidence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that
may appropriately be drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not
always the ascertainment of the kind of "fact" that precludes consid-
eration by this Court. 147
A deluge of contrasting cases arose in the appellate courts as they attempted
to work with the "ultimate fact" distinction, since the "ultimate fact" test
140. Fact identification consists of "a case-specific inquiry into what happened here. It is
designed to yield only assertions that can be made without significantly implicating the governing
legal principles." Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLuM. L. Rav. 229, 235 (1985).
141. "In a strict sense, then, law declaration yields only what we commonly think of as
'law'-conclusions about the existence and content of governing legal rules, standards, and
principles. The important point about law is that it yields a proposition that is general in
character." Id. at 235 (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 236-39.
143. 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
144. Id. at 671-72.
145. Id. at 671.
146. Id.
147. Id. In the context of this case, this statement also remains open to a much broader
interpretation. See infra note 210.
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proved very difficulty for courts to use. 4 ' In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,149
therefore, the Court abandoned the "ultimate fact" distinction, asserting
that the "clearly erroneous" rule applied with equal vigor to ultimate facts. 50
2. The Fact Application Problem Continues
The basic problem, the distinction between questions of law and questions
of fact, still remained unsolved. The Court observed in Pullman:
The Court has previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law. Rule 52(a) does not
furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact.
Nor do we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly
distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.-
As the Pullman Court explained, an appellate court can freely review findings
of fact based on an erroneous view of the controlling legal principles. If
the trial court used an incorrect legal standard, the appellate court can either
remand the case with instructions to apply the correct legal standard or
apply the standard and find the facts itself if only one factual inference
results from the corrected legal standard. 5 2 This premise, while helpful, does
not resolve the main question: how does Rule 52(a) fact review apply to
mixed questions, "questions in which the historical facts are admitted or
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts
satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated?"' 53
No current test for distinguishing law and fact proves wholly satisfactory.
Courts sometimes label issues within the province of the jury as "fact,"
and issues decided by the judge as "law." The courts then use these labels
to determine the scope of review for bench trials. 54 This reasoning provides
148. Comment, The Standard of Appellate Review in Title VIlDisparate-Treatment Actions,
50 U. Cm. L. REV. 1481, 1486-88 (1983). This Comment provides an example of the ultimate
fact distinction in one area: discriminatory intent. The author states that at the time the Comment
was written the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits treated discriminatory
intent as a finding of fact reviewable under the Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard. The
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and D.C. Circuits treated discriminatory intent as an ultimate
fact which the appellate court could review independently.
149. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
150. Id. at 287. The Court asserted: "Rule 52(a) does not divide findings of fact into those
that deal with 'ultimate' and those that deal with 'subsidiary' facts."
151. Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 287, 291-92.
153. Id. at 289-90, 289 n.19.
154. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAom. L. Rav. 1020,
1022 (1967). Some appellate courts reviewing trial judge's decisions simply review questions
normally allocated to the jury under the "clearly erroneous" fact review. These courts review
questions normally allocated to the bench in a jury trial under the independent review used
for questions of law.
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a valid foundation for appellate review, but contains notable gaps in the
area of fact application.' 5  For example, a jury usually determines a question
of whether certain actions constitute negligence. For a bench trial, however,
the circuits conflict: some apply extensive appellate review, treating negligence
as a question of law, while others use the narrower scope of review, treating
negligence as a question of fact. 5 6
A frequently cited test to distinguish law from fact appears in the Ninth
Circuit case of Lundgren v. Freeman. 57 The Ninth Circuit stated that findings
of fact are "based on the 'fact-finding tribunal's experience with the main-
springs of human conduct,"'' 5 8 while law is based on the "application of a
legal standard.' ' 59 This provides a valid general definition, but does not
solve complicated questions of law application. 16° Negligence, for instance,
involves a specific legal standard, but courts determine the contours of
"negligence" by what "experience with the mainsprings of human conduct"
defines as inexcusable carelessness.1 6'
Commentators have also wrestled with the law and fact distinction. Some
commentators urge that all cases of fact application fall within the scope
of Rule 52(a). 6 2 Rule 52(a) review for cases of fact application may promote
uniformity, but because of the difficulty of distinguishing between pure
questions of law and fact application questions, it could result in "clearly
erroneous" review for questions which should receive the full review of
questions of law, thus depriving parties of their right to the broader review.
16 3
155. Weiner observes that constitutional protections prohibit appellate review of jury fact
findings, but bench verdicts stand under no such protection. He advocates that questions
involving law application should be treated as questions of fact for a jury trial and questions
of law for a bench trial. He urges that this would result in more consistent law application
between the circuits, and the benefit of many judges rather than one making the final fact
decision. Id. at 1032-33.
156. Monaghan, supra note 140, at 232-33, 232 n.22. Often a jury decision on an issue like
negligence involves a mixture of law and fact findings. Monaghan asserts that for this reason
an issue of law application like negligence should not arbitrarily be characterized as fact.
At the present time, negligence is generally treated as fact in six jurisdictions, as a matter
of law in one jurisdiction. The other jurisdictions do not have established standards. 5A J.
MooRE, supra note 53, at § 52.0511].
157. 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
158. Id. at 115.
159. Id.
160. E.g., Weiner, supra note 154, at 1054-56; Comment, An Analysis of the Application
of the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Rule 52(a) Findings of Fact in Federal Non-Jury Cases,
53 Miss. L.J. 473, 481-83 (1983).
161. Monaghan, supra note 140, at 232-33, 232 n.22.
162. Solomon, supra note 72, at 699.
163. The mistake, mislabeling a question of law as a question of fact and thus depriving a
party of a full review, occurs in several ways. First, trial courts may characterize the issue
incorrectly, and the appellate court may fail to correct the mistake. Second, the appellate court
might ignore the trial court's correct categorization and make its own incorrect determination.
One author observes: "[l]t is the appellate court that determines whether a finding is one of
fact or law and thereby establishes the scope of review for itself .... [T]he possibility exists
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Other commentators advocate that mixed questions remain beyond the scope
of Rule 52(a), leaving only basic historical fact questions for trial court
determination.164 This approach, however, would drastically curtail the func-
tion of the trial court, since the appellate court could independently review
and alter a very large number of the trial court fact findings. 65
3. Anderson Fails to Resolve the Fact Application Problem
In Anderson, the Supreme Court ignored the law and fact distinction.
The Court altered the appellate court's final finding of discriminatory intent.
The Supreme Court's decision did not resolve the dilemma of the law and
fact distinction because, in the past, the Supreme Court has specifically
characterized questions of intent as "pure fact." Therefore, no question
arises in Anderson about whether discriminatory intent involves a question
of law or a question of fact.
Appellate court cases subsequent to Anderson reflect this continuing prob-
lem. In Zbosnik v. Badger Coal Co., 66 the appellate court reviewed the
decision of the Benefits Review Board, which had overturned a decision of
the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge stated that plain-
tiff coal miner had established a presumption of total disability from black
lung disease which defendant coal company had failed to rebut. The Board
overturned this, stating that as a matter of law defendant's evidence of
medical tests rebutted the presumption. The appellate court, citing Anderson,
said that as a matter of fact, substantial evidence supported the administrative
law judge's finding that defendant had not rebutted the presumption. 67
Here, two "appellate courts," the court and the Board, interpreted the law
and fact distinction to attain the holdings they desired. 6 The law and fact
that the appellate court will allow its opinion of the justness of the lower court's ruling to
shade its decision." Comment, supra note 160, at 481. Litigants might also incorrectly alter
the standard in hopes of achieving a broader review, and the appellate court may uphold the
incorrect change. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377, 408 (1984).
164. Comment, supra note 148, at 1497-98. See also Calleras, Title VII and Rule 52(a):
Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 58 TtL. L. RiEv. 403, 425-26 (1983).
165. One commentator points out that in the majority of cases appealed, the facts and law
are often clear, and a disputed issue concerns whether the law applies to the facts. Brown,
Allocation of Cases in a Two-Tiered Structure: The Wisconsin Experience and Beyond, 68
MARQ. L. REv. 189, 195-96 (1985). If the appellate courts could review all of these appeals
independently, the trial court would have discretion over only the most basic historical facts.
166. 759 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985).
167. The medical tests gave contrary information and doctors could not agree about the
cause of plaintiff's physical condition. Since plaintiff had worked in the coal mines for forty-
four years, the possibility of black lung disease appeared high. Id. at 1188-89.
168. In this case, if the first tribunal had held for defendant, the appellate court might have
been disturbed, feeling it unjust to deny plaintiff compensation under these facts. It might then
have attempted to achieve a just result through manipulation of the law and fact distinction.
For this reason, some commentators feel that the rules governing appellate review need some
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dilemma has also arisen in other cases. 69
C. Benefits of Anderson Outweigh Detriments for Most Cases
Despite these difficulties, Anderson provides significant benefits. As pre-
viously noted, Anderson eliminates the gloss and Orvis approaches to fact
review which had long divided the circuits, taking a substantial step toward
uniform appellate fact review. Anderson also emphasizes deference to trial
judges as fact finders. It gives trial court fact findings greater finality, and
emphasizes greater respect for trial courts' fact determinations. 70 Anderson
will undoubtedly contribute to judicial economy by reducing the number
and scope of appeals, and allow appellate judges to focus on matters of law
and truly erroneous fact findings.
On balance, for most federal cases, Anderson provides valuable guidance
to appellate review. Many of the difficulties can be lessened through Supreme
Court action in future cases. For instance, if a circuit appears, over time,
to apply Rule 52(a) with too much deference to trial courts, the Supreme
Court or the Advisory Committee can correct the approach and reaffirm,
perhaps more clearly, a more specific scope of Rule 52(a) review.
The appellate courts can also help resolve the Anderson difficulties. The
appellate courts in each circuit should develop standards for the law and
fact distinction. Then, if controversy arises between the circuits' standards,
the Supreme Court or the Advisory Committee can study the problem,
examine closely the diverse appellate approaches, and adopt the most ef-
fective approach. Anderson can thus prove suitable for most cases.' 7'
flexibility to allow appellate judges to alter the trial court decisions for a more just result even
when the procedural rules would not sanction the alteration. See Leonard, The Correctness
Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in an Era of Fragmentation, 17
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 299 (1984). See also 5A J. MOORE, supra note 53, at § 52.05[1]:
A scientific distinction between fact and law is not workable. Nor would such a
distinction serve the purpose behind Rule 52, which is to aid the trial court in
making a correct appraisal of the evidence and the law to the end that a sound
decision is made, to show what has been adjudicated for future purposes of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment, and to aid the appellate court where an appeal
is taken.
169. See In re Pearson Bros. Co., 787 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1986).
170. Some examples of conscientious application of the clearly erroneous review appear in
cases following Rule 52(a). See, e.g., Zbosnik, 759 F.2d 1187. In this case the court did not
claim to exercise a separate scope of review for cases involving witness testimony, but gave
proper deference to the trial court's ability to observe the witness: "Moreover, in choosing to
credit the testimony of the claimant, and Moyle and Albin Zbosnik, the A[dministrative] L[aw]
J[udge]'s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness is an added plus." Id. at 1189-
80.
171. The Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee can either adopt a general rule to
cover all mixed law and fact questions, can develop a method to label some mixed questions
law and others fact, or can, on a case by case basis, decide whether specific categories function
better as "law" or "fact" for purposes of Rule 52(a) review. For an example of a decision




V. ANDERSON V. CITY OF BESSEMER CITY: A DANGER TO
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
In most cases, the benefits of Anderson outweigh its detriments. An
examination of different types of cases in light of Anderson, however, reveals
that in one type of case the detriments of Anderson threaten to outweigh
its benefits. This type of case is the "constitutional fact" case, in which an
appellant claims the lower court made an erroneous fact finding, and that
this finding led to an incorrect decision about the appellant's constitutional
rights. These "constitutional facts" include any facts significant to a court's
decision about a constitutional question. Constitutional facts may include
basic, "historical" facts concerning specific parties in specific cases. They
frequently involve fact application issues, the application of a legal standard
to a specific set of facts.
A. Protection of Constitutional Rights Relies on Historical Fact
Decisions
Many constitutional rights cases rely heavily on fact decisions. For ex-
ample, in Kelleher v. Flawn,172 a plaintiff graduate assistant claimed that
defendants on a university staff removed her from her teaching position to
a non-teaching position partly because of the political opinions she expressed
in the classroom. The plaintiff asserted that their actions violated her con-
stitutionally protected right to free speech. The defendant contended that
the plaintiff's dismissal occurred because of her insubordinate attitude and
refusal to cooperate. Conflicting testimony surrounded these facts. For in-
stance, at one meeting between the plaintiff and a member of the staff, the
staff member claimed he behaved reasonably while the plaintiff responded
by screaming and cursing. The plaintiff claimed she behaved calmly as he
made angry remarks about her political lessons. 73 The reason behind the
dismissal, therefore, remained purely a factual decision subject on its face
to the Anderson review. In a case such as Flawn, however, an incorrect
district court finding might not be clearly erroneous, but might violate
plaintiff's constitutional rights. 74
Flawn demonstrates that constitutional rights protection frequently rests
on findings of "historical" facts. As pointed out previously, the "clearly
erroneous" standard of fact review, under Anderson, remains open to con-
172. 761 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1985).
173. Id. at 1082.
174. For a case in which the proper ruling for a constitutional right rested on a historical
fact decision, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (decision about whether a moment of
silence statute was meant to encourage religion in school depended on fact finding about the
legislature's motive in enacting the statute).
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flicting interpretations. Some courts, as previously mentioned, claim that
Anderson provides only a very narrow review of trial court fact findings.
The importance of constitutional rights, however, necessitates that such fact
findings are not left to the discretion of one individual, 7 s but should receive
a second judicial scrutiny to assure that a trial court's fact findings do not
permit a constitutional rights violation. Under the narrow, or even the
traditional "clearly erroneous" interpretation of Anderson, the appellate
courts will not always scrutinize trial court fact findings with this added
caution. A constitutional fact finding, therefore, could be upheld in an
appellate court because it is not "clearly erroneous," even if it does not
adequately protect a party's constitutional fights. Anderson, therefore, proves
inadequate for constitutional fact review of historical fact questions.
B. Protection of Constitutional Rights Also Relies on Fact
Application Decisions
Many crucial decisions in constitutional rights cases depend on the ap-
plication of facts to a legal standard. The broad provisions in the constitution
are defined and guarded as courts apply these provisions to specific fact
situations. In other types of federal court cases, legislatures actively assist
the courts in interpreting and formulating the laws these courts apply. For
example, in diversity cases, state legislatures can amend or redraft state
statutes to guide court application of these statutes. Congress can likewise
alter federal statutes to assist court interpretation of federal law. In consti-
tutional rights cases, however, courts serve as the primary protectors of the
rights through application of constitutional provisions to specific facts. For
example, the first amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.' ' 7 6 The courts' determinations of what constitutes protected exercise
of religion stretches into controversial fact situations, such as cases where
an individual's exercise of an allegedly religious practice clashes with other
strong state interests.177 Through their examination of such fact situations,
courts attempt to guard freedom of religion to the highest degree possible
without causing damage to society.
175. Two obvious dangers appear from leaving constitutional facts to the discretion of one
individual. First, the trial judge might occasionally make a mistake. Constitutional rights, often
resting on constitutional fact decisions, remain too important to permit the mistake to stand
unchecked. Second, constitutional cases often involve heated, emotional issues. See infra text
accompanying note 195. This fact suggests a greater possibility of decisions unintentionally
arising from personal bias. If several judges examine the decision, these mistakes have a smaller
chance of escaping unnoticed.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
177. 177. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)(Student
nondenominational religious club forbidden from meeting at a high school during activity time
because these meetings violate constitutional separation of church and state).
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The fourth amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.' 7 8 In United States v. Jones,7 9 a court confronted a fourth
amendment claim. In Jones, a chase occurred after police spotted defendant
lurking in front of an apartment while a known burglar exited from the
back. Defendant, upon seeing police, covered his face and attempted to
hide. The police then chased the defendant to his car, blocked the defendant's
car with the police car, and pointed their guns at the defendant when he
refused to identify himself or leave the car. 80 Questions about the reason-
ableness of the police's suspicions and subsequent search concern application
of a constitutional provision to the facts of this case.
Under Anderson, a judge's application of fact to law can be reviewed
either under the broad "law" review or the limited "fact" review set out
in the Rule 52(a) standard. The appellate judge exercises wide discretion in
selecting the scope of review, and the circuits differ in their categorization
of certain areas as fact or law for purposes of appellate review. Obviously,
therefore, the courts display a lack of uniformity in the type of review
chosen. In addition, one possible standard of review, the "clearly erroneous"
review, does not sufficiently guard against error in constitutional fact de-
cisions. Anderson, consequently, proves inadequate for the constitutional
fact review needed to protect constitutional rights in fact application ques-
tions.
C. Bose Suggests a Solution to the Anderson Problem
1. History of Independent Constitutional Fact Review
The Anderson review presents a problem; it does not allow a second
scrutiny of constitutional facts which is broad enough to best protect con-
stitutional rights. One possible solution to this problem lies in a constitutional
fact exception found in some past cases. This exception provides for an
added review of constitutional facts so that appellate courts will scrutinize
these facts more independently than the clearly erroneous rule sanctions.
This exception first emerged in cases where the Supreme Court independently
reviewed the findings of an administrative agency.' 8' Later, the Supreme
Court asserted that it would exercise independent review of constitutional
facts when these facts proved crucial to the outcome of the case. In Fiske
178. U.S. CoNsr. amend IV.
179. 759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 113 (1985).
180. Id. at 635.
181. For an example of judicial review of an administrative agency decision concerning the
constitutional issues in the agency decision, see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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v. Kansas,'82 the Court reviewed a judgment about the constitutionality of
a state statute. The Court examined the facts independently to conclude that
there was no evidence supporting the charge against the defendant.
In subsequent cases, the Court mentioned a doctrine giving special pre-
rogative to constitutional fact review.'8 3 The Court described this doctrine
in Pennekamp v. Florida,84 a first amendment case:
The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to deter-
mine the meaning and application of those words of that instrument
which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that respon-
sibility, we are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue
and the circumstances under which they were made to see whether or
not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality
and good order of the courts or whether they are of a character which
the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.'85
2. Constitutional Fact Review Today: The Standard Remains
Uncertain
At times, as in Pennelcamp, the Supreme Court has stated that it can
freely review constitutional facts.'8 6 The Court, however, has not adequately
clarified the doctrine of independent constitutional fact review. The Court
sometimes speaks of independent fact review of first amendment cases and
fails to mention that it applies to all constitutional fact cases.8 7 In some
182. 274 U.S. 380 (1927). In this early case, the Court said independent fact review was
proper when needed to reach a proper outcome for a federal right. Later decisions narrowed
this to include only constitutional rights.
183. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). In this case the Court held
unconstitutional defendant's conviction for breach of the peace for a nonviolent desegregation
demonstration; the Court stated that it had a duty to make an independent examination of
the entire record. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1963). Justice Brennan, speaking for the
majority, rejected a suggestion that the Court could treat questions about the obscenity of an
individual book or movie as a pure fact question within the trial court's discretion:
The suggestion is appealing, since it would lift from our shoulders a difficult,
recurring, and unpleasant task. But we cannot accept it. Such an abnegation ofjudicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent with our duty to uphold
the constitutional guarantees. Since it is only 'obscenity' that is excluded from
the constitutional protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene
necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law.
Id. at 187-88.
184. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
185. Id. at 335.
186. See supra note 183. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(Court held
that defendant could play a religious record on the street as an examination of the facts revealed
that this threatened no public danger, and was therefore protected by the first amendment
freedom of religion mandate).
187. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting in the result).
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constitutional fact cases, including a recent case, the Court used the Rule
52(a) "clearly erroneous" review. 188 In still other constitutional cases, the
Supreme Court stated that the fact application questions were questions of
law, to be reviewed independently. 8 9
3. Support for Independent Constitutional Fact Review
a. The First Amendment Cases
Two recent Supreme Court cases contain an in-depth discussion of the
constitutional fact issue, and they illustrate why independent review of con-
stitutional facts is necessary. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 190 the plaintiff
claimed respondent's advertisement contained false statements about police
activities in a civil rights demonstration. The trial court held that the state-
ments' falseness made them per se libelous.' 9' The Supreme Court, after a
complete examination of the facts, reversed. The Court held that plaintiffs
must prove defendant's actual malice, defined as knowledge or reckless
disregard of a statement's lack of truth, before the court can hold defendant
guilty of libel. 92 The Court struck down the Alabama law as unconstitutional,
but independently examined the facts to determine that there was a lack of
actual malice in the defendant's advertisement: "This Court's duty is not
limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper
cases review the evidence to make certain that these principles have been
constitutionally applied. '93
Had the Court in New York Times applied the "clearly erroneous" rule,
the trial court's decision would have prevailed. Respondent's advertisement
would have been denied first amendment protection solely because it criticized
a political figure and contained incorrect information. As the Court pointed
out, this would have, as a practical matter, curtailed the right of the re-
188. One recent example of a Supreme Court failure to review a constitutional claim under
independent review occurred in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In this
due process case, the Court stated that the appellate court should have reviewed the district
court's decision under the Anderson clearly erroneous standard. The Court made no mention
of an independent constitutional fact review.
189. One commentator observed, "the Court usually did not state that it would review a
finding of 'pure fact.' Instead, it labeled the question for review a 'constitutional standard.'
Arguably, this was analogous to calling the question one of application of law to fact."
Comment, The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases-the Supreme Court
Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual-Malice, 36 MERCER
L. REv. 711, 713-14 (1985).
190. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
191. Id. at 262.
192. Id. at 271-79.
193. Id. at 285.
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spondent to criticize the government, a right which is at the core of the
constitutional free speech protection. 9 4 The Court also noted that the decision
arose in a political climate hostile to desegregation. Political concerns might
therefore have influenced the lower court's decision.195 Had the Supreme
Court, or an appellate court, felt bound by the "clearly erroneous" rule to
uphold the trial court's decision, respondent would have suffered a consti-
tutional rights violation.
These policy considerations appeared with greater magnitude in Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, 96 a case involving another actual
malice question. In this case, the plaintiff charged the defendant with libel
for printing false and malicious statements which injured the plaintiff's
business. The defendant music reviewers had written that the sound emitting
from the loudspeakers the plaintiff designed seemed to move "about the
room." The district court found that the sound moved "along the wall"
and since the statement "about the room" attributes "such grotesque qual-
ities as instruments wandering about the room," the statement could inhibit
sales of plaintiffs' loudspeakers. 97 The court said the defendant had actual
knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth of the statement because a
panel's examination of the circumstances revealed the statement's incor-
rectness. 98 After independently reviewing the facts of the case, the Supreme
Court upheld the appellate court's reversal, stating that actual knowledge
had to involve more than an imprecise statement.199
The Court seemed to base its ability to freely review the facts on different
justifications. First, the Court spoke of the common law heritage of inde-
pendent review in the actual malice case. 200 The Court did not focus on the
common law heritage issue. Furthermore, confusion would arise if courts
had to trace the history of each type of case to determine the scope of fact
review for that case. 201 These facts strongly suggest that the Court's decision
to review the facts independently did not arise from the "common law
heritage" of independent review in actual malice cases.
194. Id. at 271-79.
195. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
196. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
197. 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485
(1984). Defendant published an evaluation of twenty-four loudspeakers in the magazine Con-
sumer Reports. Defendant had reviewed plaintiff's loudspeakers harshly, and plaintiff sued,
claiming that the review was harmful to sale of the equipment.
198. Id. at 1277.
199. 466 U.S. at 513. The Court said, "The choice of the language used, though reflecting
a misconception, did not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment's
broad protective umbrella."
200. Id. at 502. The Court, without elaboration, stated that the common law heritage of
the rule gave the judge and court adjudication an important place in its development.
201. Monaghan, supra note 140, at 243-44.
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Second, the Court spoke of free appellate fact review of first amendment
issues concerning libel, and at times, free appellate review of all first amend-
ment issues.2 02 This could suggest that the Court intended independent ap-
pellate fact review to apply only to first amendment cases, or, more narrowly,
first amendment libel cases. For example, the Court stated, "We hold that
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing
a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times v.
Sullivan."20 3 Some commentators suggest that the Bose fact review could
apply only to first amendment cases, although most commentators seem to
dislike this interpretation. 204 Some appellate courts have specified that Bose
applies to first amendment issues while avoiding any reference to general
constitutional fact review.205 One commentator narrowed the interpretation
even further: "Apparently, the Court wanted to state clearly that independent
appellate review is the sole standard of review for findings of actual malice
in libel cases."
A third rationale, however, proves most plausible: the Supreme Court
intended the Bose review to apply to all cases using constitutional facts.2°7
First amendment questions prove no more difficult than questions about
other constitutional provisions, so the difficulty of first amendment inter-
pretation does not justify a special review for first amendment issues. Fur-
202. Bose, 466 U.S. at 503-11.
203. Id. at 514.
204. See Abrams, The Supreme Court Turns a New Page in Libel, 70 A.B.A. J. 89, 91
(August 1984).
205. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 932 n.3, 933 n.4 (1986)
(Supreme Court observed that appellate court refusal to accept district court fact decision may
have arisen in part from the appellate court's belief that it could review first amendment
decisions independently under Bose. The Court declined to address this contention since it
believed the appellate reversal was incorrect under any standard.). See also Lebron v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court said the Supreme Court in
Bose "set out the responsibility to an appellate court in cases raising first amendment issues.");
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (court
said Bose required independent review for evidence of actual knowledge in actual malice cases).
206. See Comment, supra note 189, at 729. This Comment described the many interpretations
Bose could support, and apparently accepted the narrower interpretation. Earlier, the Comment
discussed the history of independent constitutional fact review, stating that this review, while
never established by the Court with sufficient clarity, had generally applied to application of
legal standards to historical facts which, the Comment stated, would fall outside of Rule 52(a).
The Comment stated that the Court in Bose stated a historical fact, the writer's state of mind,
and therefore moved into the realm of Rule 52(a) review. See also Note, Defamation-A
Standard of Review for Constitutional Facts, 7 U. ARK. LrrraE RoCK L.J. 741 (1984).
207. Some commentators want to apply Bose in this way, but want to limit the case to
questions of fact application in constitutional fact cases, and leave historical facts solely under
Rule 52(a). Note, Can Civil Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-Exist with Independent Review in Actual
Malice Cases?, 60 WASH. L. REv. 503, 521 (1985).
This Note, in contrast to the commentators mentioned above, states that Bose should apply
to historical facts because of their importance in court decisions about constitutional rights.
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thermore, other constitutional rights have an importance equal to that of
first amendment rights and deserve an equivalent protection. 28
Statements abound in Bose to support the contention that all constitutional
provisions deserve equal review. The Court repeatedly speaks of the impor-
tance of all constitutional rights, and the need to guard these from possible
improper interpretation by a judge or jury in the trial court. 2°9 As an example,
the Court explained that its general definition of the types of protected and
unprotected communication does not provide infallible guidance to the trial
courts in determining first amendment cases. At times, the trial courts might
err, and, because of the importance of constitutional rights, some check
must guard against such error and its ensuing alteration of constitutional
principles. 210 This explanation applies equally well to all constitutional rights.
b. The Desegregation Cases
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should advocate independent
fact review for all cases involving constitutional rights. Further support for
this contention appears in a line of school desegregation cases involving the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. These cases followed Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka,21' in which the Court ordered school
desegregation. Soon after the Brown decision, tumult arose in the school
districts, and some school boards and cities attempted to evade the deseg-
regation mandate. The Supreme court recognized this problem and ordered
the school districts to implement desegregation plans under the supervision
of the district courts. 212
208. Monaghan, supra note 140, at 270: "[I]t is not apparent that first amendment rules
are less precise than other rules of constitutional privilege".
209. 466 U.S. 485. As an example, Justice Stevens stated: "The requirement of independent
appellate review enunciated in New York Times ... reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges-particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve
precious [Constitutional] liberties." Id. at 510-11.
210. At this point, the Court cited Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71
(1944), to say that independent appellate review of fact decisions becomes especially important
where the fact decision involves broad social judgments. Bose, 466 U.S. at 500 n.16. This
appears to interpret Baumgartner more thoroughly and accurately than former cases that used
Baumgartner to support an oral and documentary evidence distinction or an ultimate and
subsidiary fact distinction. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. In this context,
Baumgartner strongly supports a constitutional fact review since it relied on questions of
historical fact to establish the first amendment claim. The fact questions centered around
whether Baumgartner's subsequent behavior sufficiently proved his disloyalty at the time he
took the oath, which would justify a court's depriving him of citizenship. The Court in
Baumgartner did not fully clarify its reason for examining the facts independently, but an
examination of Baumgartner in the context of Bose strongly suggests that the Baumgartner
Court was advocating independent appellate review of constitutional facts.
211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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The district courts therefore exercised an important role, yet in the ensuing
years the Supreme Court examined numerous desegregation cases to test the
constitutionality of plans approved by the district and appellate courts. Since
a desegregation remedy's appropriateness depended on the circumstances of
each particular case, the Supreme Court consistently examined specific facts.
The cases presented unique fact situations. In Keyes v. School District No.
1, Denver,2 3 for example, the school district manipulated zoning laws to
defeat desegregation in one part of the city and the plaintiffs contended that
this evidenced intentional segregation in the entire city, requiring affirmative
city wide desegregation. In Wright v. Council of Emporia,2 4 a new munic-
ipality desired a separate school system, which would result in a segregated
system for the county in which Emporia was located.
In some cases, the Supreme Court simply looked at the basic facts about
the desegregation plan and declared a school system's plan unconstitu-
tional. 21 An example of this situation appears in Griffin v. County School
Board.2 6 Here, the Court found a county's system of closing public schools
and giving children funds to attend segregated private schools a violation
of fourteenth amendment rights. 217 In other cases, the basic desegregation
plan appeared valid, yet the Supreme Court, to protect the constitutional
rights, delved beneath the surface of the plan to examine underlying facts
such as the history of race discrimination in the area, the prior and current
ratios of the number of black and white children in each school, and the
number of minority faculty members in each school.218 The Court did not
speak of an independent appellate review of constitutional facts in these
cases as it had in the first amendment cases. 2 9 Nevertheless, its willingness
213. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Court stated that "common sense dictates" that segregation
in one area will affect the desegregation efforts of other areas. Id. at 203. The Court supported
this contention with a thorough examination of the facts, including the racial composition of
the schools, the assignment policies regarding minority teachers, and the policies of zoning and
selection of school sites.
214. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
215. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
216. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
217. Id. This case proved unusually straightforward for a desegregation case, since the school
district's statements revealed that it acted in open defiance of the law. Therefore, the Court
did not need to examine extrinsic evidence as fully as in cases where districts employed more
subtle means to avoid desegregation.
218. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court studied
statistics concerning the racial composition of the school to conclude that the district plan was
insufficient. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the district adopted a freedom
of choice desegregation plan. The Court pointed out that the validity of this plan depended
on the other circumstances; and on an independent examination of statistics and other evidence
found that this plan did not sufficiently integrate the schools.
219. In one case the Court specifically mentioned an extensive examination of the evidence
by a court of appeals: "On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed all aspects of desegregation
in Mobile County. Additional information was requested regarding earlier desegregation plans
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to examine each fact situation carefully to guard against a denial of four-
teenth amendment rights strongly suggests that the Court intends independent
constitutional fact review to extend beyond the boundaries of the first amend-
ment.220
c. Bose: Independent Constitutional Fact Review in the Appellate Courts
Bose also provides strong support for giving the responsibility for inde-
pendent constitutional fact review to appellate courts as well as to the
Supreme Court. At one point, the Court explains that the constitutional fact
review applies to review of federal as well as state litigation, thus placing it
in the domain of the federal courts. 22' The Supreme Court also stated
specifically that appellate courts hold this responsibility: "[I]n cases raising
First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to 'make
an independent examination of the whole record [to ensure] that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion in the field of free expression.'
As stated previously, appellate courts should interpret this statement to
include all constitutional fact review questions, since the first amendment
has neither extra complexity nor extra importance to justify a special first
amendment review. Thus, Bose opened the door to a wider scope of con-
stitutional fact review than that provided by Rule 52(a). z2
B. Bose: Too Uncertain to Provide Adequate Constitutional Fact
Review
Bose, in itself, does not provide sufficient protection for constitutional
fact review. As is obvious from the commentators' assertions, Bose reason-
for the rural parts of the county, and those plans were approved." Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 35 (1971).
220. In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), the Supreme Court purported
to review the facts under the clearly erroneous standard. However, the thorough report about
the facts in the case, and the subsequent decision based on these facts suggest that the Court
actually engaged in a more independent review of the constitutional facts.
221. 466 U.S. at 499.
222. Id. at 499 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284-86).
223. In Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985), the Court pointed out that courts may label
a finding "law" or "fact" because they believe a certain tribunal is in a better position to
make final decisions on those findings:
Where, for example, as with proof of actual malice in First-Amendment libel
cases, the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application
to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give
the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal
appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law.
Id. at 452. This logic applies with equal force to all constitutional fact cases. It would be
clearer and easier simply to allow all trial court denials of constitutional claims to receive an
added independent review rather than to try to achieve this result through manipulation of the
law and fact labels.
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ably supports a variety of interpretations. Courts can view Bose as sanc-
tioning independent appellate review for only first amendment cases, or at
the narrowest level, for first amendment libel cases. At the appellate level,
many of the cases citing Bose involve one of these issues. 224 Appellate courts
reviewing different types of constitutional fact issues frequently cite only
Anderson and purport to use the Anderson review, ignoring Bose.?
Courts can also interpret Bose to support independent review for questions
of law, but not for questions of fact. At one point the Bose Court stated,
"We may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and
nevertheless hold as a matter of law" that the record did not prove defend-
ant's knowledge or reckless disregard about the falseness of the statements. 226
Bose emphasizes broad review of constitutional fact findings, yet some
statements in Bose might lead courts to interpret the case as advocating
independent review only for questions of "law." Anderson can arguably
support this contention, since the Anderson Court specified: "[R]ule 52
'does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual
findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court's
findings unless clearly erroneous.' -227 The Court in Anderson intended this
statement to apply to the oral and documentary fact distinction. 228 An ap-
pellate court could, however, apply this statement, as Powell and Blackmun
feared, to place all fact findings automatically within the clearly erroneous
review standard regardless of compelling arguments that certain types of
facts require a broader appellate review. 229
Courts can also interpret constitutional fact review too broadly. The Court
in Bose cautioned against this:
Altho'Ugh the Court of Appeals stated that it must perform a de novo
review, it is plain that the Court of Appeals did not overturn any factual
finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, but instead engaged in
an independent assessment only of the evidence germane to the actual-
malice determination.7 0
An appellate court, then, should not manipulate fact findings in a consti-
tutional case simply to reach a different result than the trial court reached.
Instead, the appellate court should use the independent scrutiny of consti-
224. See supra note 205.
225. See, e.g., Belissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1244 (1986); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1985); Collins v. City
of Norfolk, Va., 768 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3326 (1986); Gorham v.
Franzen, 760 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 255 (1986). In cases like these,
the courts failed to use independent fact review for constitutional facts.
226. 446 U.S. at 513.
227. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (quoting Pullman-Standard
v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)).
228. Id. at 573-76.
229. Id. at 581 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 581-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
230. 466 U.S. at 514 n.31.
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tutional facts only to insure that the trial court fact findings did not result
in a constitutional rights violation.
Several cases which purport to apply Anderson to constitutional facts
actually apply this type of overly broad de novo review. In United States
v. Shears,-3' the district court ordered the defendant's involuntary confession
suppressed but the appellate court reversed the district court order. The
defendant claimed he made this confession because the interrogators im-
pliedly promised that the confession would procure him more lenient treat-
ment. The decision rested on contrary and ambiguous evidence. At the trial,
the defendant denied that the interrogators had made any promise to him,232
yet he claimed the events surrounding the interrogation and the questioners'
actions implied such a promise. For instance, the government agent told him
that if he cooperated he would not need a bail bondsman, and that he
should not let word of the arrest reach the street. A dissent argued that
independent appellate review should apply on the issue of voluntariness, a
due process concern, but that it should only apply when the lower court
denied a constitutional rights claim, not when the lower court upheld such
a claim. 2 3 As the dissent points out, this fact finding involved a question
of demeanor, especially suited for trial court determination. The dissent did
not cite Bose, but aptly captured the theory behind Bose. Constitutional fact
issues require added scrutiny in order to prevent constitutional rights vio-
lations. Courts should use added scrutiny to prevent a constitutional rights
violation, but not to overturn a trial court that has accepted a constitutional
rights claim. 23 4
Cases like Shears demonstrate that complete de novo review for consti-
tutional fact cases places a party claiming a constitutional rights violation
under a greater risk than a plaintiff or defendant in another type of case.
If the trial court finds that the constitutional rights violation occurred, the
appellate court could freely review and reverse the decision, unchecked by
the clearly erroneous standard. Therefore, a party claiming a constitutional
rights violation would run a double risk of having his claim improperly
231. 762 F.2d 397.
232. Id. at 403. When the prosecutor questioned defendant about the implied "promise"
defendant responded: "He didn't promise me anything. All he said is he had some people that
he had, wanted to talk to me, which meant one thing to me, you know, so somebody wanted
to talk to me to do some business with me. Would that mean that to you?" This obviously
remains open to several interpretations. The district court, looking at all the circumstances,
held that the government agent made an implied promise. The appellate court reversed. The
dissenting appellate justice criticized the majority, saying the circumstances and the above
statement could reasonably be interpreted as the district court ruled.
233. Id. at 405 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent said, "I simply sense injustice in
denying to Shears the benefits of a district judge's findings when the 'not clearly erroneous
rule' has worked so often in favor of the government against other defendants."
234. Id. at 403-05 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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denied. As noted earlier, constitutional cases often involve heated, contro-
versial issues. If the appellate court feels free to disregard the trial court's
fact findings, it can easily reinterpret the evidence and change the decision
based on the appellate judges' opinions of the controverted issue. Complete
de novo review of constitutional fact claims, therefore, would enhance the
danger of an improper denial of a constitutional rights claim. Bose does not
sanction this; instead, the Bose Court accepted the judges' findings on
historical facts and gave credit to the judges' interpretation of conflicting
evidence. The Court carefully examined the facts only to see if the trial
court's interpretation of the facts permitted a violation of constitutional
rights.2Y5
Bose therefore suggests that courts should review constitutional facts in-
dependently. This suggestion provides a helpful "first step" toward solving
the constitutional fact dilemma, but does not eliminate the confusion in this
area. First, as evident from the interpretations of the commentators and the
lower courts, Bose can be interpreted to apply solely to first amendment
cases or first amendment libel cases. It should, however, be consistently
applied to all cases involving constitutional facts, since all constitutional
rights deserve equal protection. Second, Bose review should only apply when
a trial court denies a constitutional rights claim. This would prevent unjust
denials of constitutional rights. If Bose review applied when the lower court
upheld a constitutional rights claim, litigants in constitutional rights cases
would run the risk of an unjust denial of their constitutional rights twice.
In other words, when a court denies a litigant's constitutional rights claim,
the litigant should have the chance to have this claim examined independently
at the appellate level to assure that the denial was just. As evident from
lower court interpretations, however, Bose did not adequately clarify this
point, either.
235. 466 U.S. at 500. The Bose Court stated that Rule 52(a) and constitutional fact review
could work together. First, the Court explained that Rule 52(a) does not prevent independent
examination of facts, and the constitutional fact review does not prevent giving due deference
for the trial court's opportunity to examine witnesses. Presumably this would include the trial
judge's chance to observe documentary evidence as well. The Court stated:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles through which
it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a fact is 'found' crosses
the line between application of those ordinary principles of logic and common
experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the realm of
a legal rule upon which the reviewing court must exercise its own independent
judgment.
Id. at 501 n.17. The Court stated that where the line was drawn depended on the case's
substantive issues, and then spoke of "largely factual" issues which, because of their importance,
warranted appellate review. It can be contended that these issues, from the context of Bose,
are constitutional facts upon which the constitutional rights decision is based. Id. at 501.
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VI. THE SOLUTION: A DECISrvE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT REVIEW
The Supreme Court should address the issue of independent constitutional
fact review in a new case. Constitutional rights, guarded by constitutional
fact adjudication, are too important to leave to varying, unpredictable and
ineffective standards of review. A standard is needed to insure independent
appellate review of lower court fact findings which result in a denial of a
constitutional rights claim.23 6 To achieve a standard for consistent review,
the Supreme Court should mandate that the scope of constitutional fact
review be one in which appellate courts give due deference to the trial court's
fact interpretation.
The appellate courts, however, should also independently examine the trial
court's constitutional fact findings in order to ensure that these findings do
not violate a litigant's constitutional rights. In other words, the appellate
courts must independently examine the facts in light of the relevant precedent
cases concerning that constitutional issue and the policy considerations behind
that constitutional issue. This examination should insure that the litigants'
constitutional rights are protected to the highest degree possible. To ensure
uniformity in the review, the Supreme Court should explicitly categorize
constitutional fact review as an exception to the Anderson "clearly erro-
neous" standard. This exception, the Court should emphasize, must apply
in every constitutional fact case; the appellate courts should not have dis-
cretion to choose not to exercise the review. The Court should include both
historical and fact application cases within this exception. This would insure
uniformity, and it would also avoid an overly broad review through which
the appellate court might deny a constitutional rights claim sustained by the
lower courts.
Some commentators will contend that federal rights should receive the
same review as constitutional rights. However, federal rights obviously do
not hold the special position of constitutional rights. Furthermore, at present,
an amendment stretching fact review too broadly would defeat the purpose
of Anderson and create more confusion. As seen, Anderson contains many
significant benefits: a lessening of appeals, judicial economy, a more uniform
standard of review, deference to the trial court fact findings, and finality.
Anderson should have a chance to apply to a broad range of cases so that
the Committee and courts might accurately test its validity, and discover
and redeem its limitations in future cases and amendments. Furthermore,
in federal statutory cases, the legislature could amend statutes if courts
236. Sometimes, the courts apply the careful, independent fact review needed for constitu-
tional cases without citing Bose. A Supreme Court statement of the standards would insure
that this is done consistently.
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consistently apply them improperly. The constitutional fact cases do not
have this safeguard but depend almost wholly on fact adjudication. This
factor, as well as the recognized special importance of constitutional cases,
shows that only the constitutional fact review needs a protection beyond
Anderson.
At present, a federal appellate judge reviewing a constitutional fact issue
is confronted by a bewildering array of standards of review. Some of the
standards are too limited or too broad to provide a review of constitutional
facts that will best protect constitutional rights. Under this Note's proposed
solution, the appellate judge should independently review constitutional facts
to ensure that the trial court findings do not permit a constitutional rights
violation. This review should apply as an exception to the "clearly erroneous"
standard enunciated in Anderson. This limited independent review will up-
hold the role of federal courts as the guardians of each individual's consti-
tutional rights.
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